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Information Duties in the Internet Era: Case Note on Content
Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer
CÃTÃLINA GOANŢÃ*
Abstract: The growth of the information society is enthusiastically embraced by the
European Commission, which sees in the booming number of citizens purchasing
goods online a strengthening of the internal market by way of an increase of
cross-border trade. As is well known, contracts through which consumers buy products
or demand services from traders that are not in their physical vicinity are considered
to be distance contracts and are thus regulated by the Distance Selling Directive
(DSD). Ironically, the DSD was not drafted with e-commerce in mind, which is
understandable as the initial proposal dates from 1992. However, it was only adopted
in 1997, and the fact that it still makes reference to decrepit distance communication
techniques such as videophone and videotext, while failing to mention the internet
even once, poses questions about its suitability to meet the technological progress of
the last decade. An accurate illustration of this problem can be found in the 2012
Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer case. The analysis focused on
determining whether sending a link via e-mail would meet the requirements of Article
5(1) of the DSD, which requires that the consumer receives or is given written
confirmation of the relevant information or confirmation on another durable medium
available.
Résumé: La croissance de la société de l’information est accueillie avec enthousiasme
par la Commission européenne, qui voit dans le nombre en plein essor des citoyens
qui achètent des biens en ligne un renforcement du marché intérieur par le biais d’une
augmentation de commerce transfrontalier. Comme c’est bien connu, les contrats par
lesquels les consommateurs achètent des produits ou demandent des services des
commerçants qui ne sont pas dans leur voisinage physique sont considérés comme des
contrats à distance, et sont donc réglementés par la Directive concernant la protection
des consommateurs en matière de contrats à distance (DSD). Ironiquement, la
Directive sur la vente à distance n’a pas été rédigée avec l’e-commerce à l’esprit, parce
que la proposition originale est daté 1992. Cependant, il n’a été adopté qu’en 1997, et
le fait qu’il fait encore référence à techniques décrépit de communication à distance
telles que la visiophone et le vidéotexte, tout en omettant de mentionner l’Internet
même une fois, pose des questions sur son justesse en répondre à l’évolution
technologique de la dernière décennie. Une illustration exacte de ce problème peut
être trouvée dans le Content Services cas. L’analyse vise à déterminer si l’envoi d’un
lien par e-mail répond aux exigences de l’article 5 (1) de la DSD, qui exige que le
consommateur reçoit ou est fournie une confirmation écrite des informations
pertinentes ou la confirmation sur un autre support durable à sa disposition.
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Zusammenfassung: Das Wachstum der Informationsgesellschaft wird begeistert von
der Europäischen Kommission aufgegriffen, welche in der steigenden Anzahl von
Bürgern, die Güter über das Internet erwerben, eine Stärkung des Binnenmarktes,
durch die Zunahme vom grenzüberschreitendem Handel, sieht. Wie allgemein bekannt
ist, werden Verträge, welche Verbraucher nutzten um Produkte oder Dienstleistungen
von Händlern zu erwerben, welche nicht in unmittelbarer Nähe sind, als
Fernabsatzverträgen bezeichnet, und somit durch die Fernabsatzrichtlinie (97/7/EG)
geregelt. Ironischerweise wurde die Fernabsatzrichtlinie nicht mit dem elektronischen
Handel (eCommerce) im Hinterkopf entworfen, da der ursprüngliche Vorschlag aus
dem Jahr 1992 stammt. Allerdings wurde er jedoch erst im Jahr 1997 angenommen,
und die Tatsache, dass es immer noch Bezug auf veraltete
Fernkommunikationstechniken wie Videotelefonie und Videotext nimmt, während er
das Internet nicht einmal erwähnt, wirft Fragen, über die Fähigkeit den
technologischen Fortschritt des letzten Jahrzehnts gerecht zu werden, auf. Eine
genaue Darstellung dieses Problems kann in dem Content Services Fall von 2012
gefunden werden. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf die Frage ob das Senden eines
Links per E-Mail die Anforderungen von Artikel 5 (1) der Fernabsatzrichtlinie erfüllt,
was voraussetzt, dass der Verbraucher eine schriftliche Bestätigung der relevanten
Informationen erhält oder alternative eine Bestätigung durch ein anderes zur
Verfügung stehendes dauerhaftes Medium.
1. Introduction
It is 2012, and information technology is here to stay. According to a
Eurobarometer with data from 2009, on average 57% of European households had
internet access,1 while in 2011, this rate had gone up to 73%, which means three
out of four European households can surf the world wide web.2 To this we can add
that almost 30% of European citizens are currently using a smartphone or other
mobile device to go online, access retail sites, or purchase apps.3
The growth of the information society is enthusiastically embraced by the
European Commission, which sees in the booming number of citizens purchasing
goods online4 a strengthening of the internal market by way of an increase of
1 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL INFORMATION SOCIETY AND MEDIA, E-Communications House-
hold Survey Summary, October 2010, at 10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_
opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_335_sum_en.pdf.
2 Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012, at 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_
society/digital-agenda/scoreboard/docs/2012/scoreboard_digital_skills.pdf.
3 Ibid., at 7; comScore, ‘1 in 8 European Smartphone Owners Conducted a Retail Transaction on
Their Device’, Press Release, 26 Jul. 2012, available at http://www.comscore.com/Press_
Events/Press_Releases/2012/7/1_in_8_European_Smartphone_Owners_Conducted_a_Retail_Tra
nsaction_on_their_Device.
4 The average EU population percentage ordering goods from services online has increased from
30% in 2007 to 42.7% in 2011.
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cross-border trade.5 As is well known, contracts through which consumers buy
products or demand services from traders that are not in their physical vicinity are
considered to be distance contracts and are thus regulated by the Distance Selling
Directive (DSD).6 The protective ambit of this Directive consists in the creation of
a number of rights consumers can benefit from in distance contracts, for example
rights related to the provision of information by the seller or supplier.7 The
existence of such rights is motivated by the inability of consumers to assess the
quality of goods or services before they are being delivered.8 This is said to
weaken their contractual standing, reduce the predictability of the contractual
outcome, and leave consumers vulnerable to abuse.9 For this reason, the rules
enshrined in the DSD are an attempt to strengthen the consumer’s position in
such a manner that he will not be deterred from purchasing goods at a distance.
Ironically, the DSD was not drafted with e-commerce in mind, which is
understandable as the initial proposal dates from 1992.10 However, it was only
adopted in 1997, and the fact that it still makes reference to decrepit distance
communication techniques such as videophone and videotext, while failing to
mention the internet even once,11 poses questions about its suitability to meet the
technological progress of the last decade.
An accurate illustration of this problem can be found in the 2012 Content
Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer (hereinafter ‘Content Services’) case.12 The
analysis focused on determining whether sending a link via e-mail would meet the
requirements of Article 5(1) DSD, requiring that the consumer receives or is
5 V. MAK, ‘Standards of Protection: In Search of the “Average Consumer” of EU Law in the
Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive’, 19. ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2011,
pp. 25–42, at 26.
6 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts.
7 S. GRUNDMANN, ‘Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract
Law’, 39. CMLR (Common Market Law Review) 2002, pp. 269–293, at 276.
8 See, e.g., J. DICKIE, ‘Consumer Confidence and the EC Directive on Distance Contracts’, 21.
J. Consumer Pol’y (Journal of Consumer Policy) 1998, pp. 217–229, at 217; G. BORGES &
B. IRLENBUSCH, ‘Fairness Crowded Out by Law: An Experimental Study on Withdrawal Rights’,
163. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 2007, pp. 84–101, at 85;
J. ROTHCHILD, ‘Making the Market Work: Enhancing Consumer Sovereignty through the
Telemarketing Sales Rule and the Distance Selling Directive’, 21. J. Consumer Pol’y 1998, pp.
279–313; V. MAK, 2011, at p. 33.
9 E. MIK, ‘Mistaken Identity, Identity Theft and Problems of Remote Authentication in
E-Commerce’, 28. Computer Law & Security Review 2012, pp. 396–402, at 397.
10 J. HORNLE et al., ‘Directive 97/7/EC on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance
Contracts’, in A.R. Lodder, H.W.K. Kaspersen (eds), eDirectives: Guide to European Union Law
on E-Commerce, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002, p. 12.
11 K. HENDERSON & A. POULTER, ‘The Distance Selling Directive: Points for Future Revision’,
16. International Review of Law Computers & Technology 2002, pp. 289–300, at 290.
12 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, ECR [2012] forthcoming.
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given written confirmation of the relevant information or confirmation on another
durable medium available. In what follows, the case will be presented and
analysed in this order: first, the facts of the case will be discussed. Then, after
outlining the structure of the CJEU’s judgment, the Court’s rationale will be
subjected to scrutiny and criticized.
2. Facts of the Case
Content Services, a limited liability company registered under English law, runs a
branch in Germany (Mannheim). It operates a website (www.opendownload.de) in
German, allowing its users to download either free or paid versions of software
after registering via a form. This form asks for personal and contact details of the
subscriber and has a small box that must be ticked for the completion of
registration. The box refers to the terms and conditions of the website, and it
specifies that users give up their right of withdrawal.13 Finalizing the registration
process is not possible without ticking this particular box. After filling in the
form, the user receives an e-mail from Content Services Ltd with a username,
password, and web link. Not long after this moment, the user receives another
e-mail containing an invoice of EUR 96 for the costs of membership. The user is
additionally reminded that he has waived his right of withdrawal and has no other
option than to pay the fee.
Content Services Ltd is not the only European business using such an
aggressive policy, clearly in violation of European consumer law. Two other
German companies, Tropmi Payment GmbH and Antassia GmbH, are well-known
operators of similar websites (www.top-of-software.de, www.software-and-tools.
deand www.softwaresammler.de). Well-known on web forums are also the lawyers
who send official reminders to the users, stating that they must pay the
subscription fees according to the contract.14 As case law reflects, most of these
practices bothered the German online community around 2009–2010, and courts
reacted to this by awarding damages to consumers who fell prey to this abusive
practice. For instance, on 14 January 2010, the Regional Court of Mannheim
(hereinafter ‘Regional Court’) delivered a judgment in a case where the plaintiff
was a consumer who had created an account with www.opendownload.de and
subsequently received a bill, as detailed in the process above. He did not respond
and was later contacted by Content Services’ lawyer,
13 It does not fall within the ambit of the question referred to the Court of Justice of the European
Union to look into the lawfulness of waiving the right of withdrawal, which would infringe Art.
21(1) of the Distance Selling Directive (DSD); see Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case
C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 15.
14 See, for instance, the Netzwelt forum, with 800 posts on the practices of Content Service’s
former lawyer, Olaf Tank, available online at http://www.netzwelt.de/forum/vermeintliche-
gratisdienste-abofallen/58476-opendownload-de-load2009-com-content-services-ltd-40.html.
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who urged him to pay. The plaintiff then hired a lawyer himself, making the
website’s owner to back down from any claims. The case before the Regional
Court dealt with damages arising from the payment of legal fees by the consumer.
On basis of sections 133 and 155 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), the Court
determined that there was no validly concluded contract and thus no valid ground
for Content Services to ask for payment; the Court awarded damages in favour of
the plaintiff.15 In another case, charging subscription costs for downloading
software that is also available for free (such as Mozilla Firefox) was considered,
according to sections 3 et seq. UWG, an unfair commercial practice.16 These
practices still seem to exist: in 2012, for example, the Osnabrück police advised
consumers who fell into the paid-subscription trap to file complaints with the
local authorities.17
In the Content Services case, the Bundesarbeitskammer, the Austrian
Chamber of Labor that is also active in the area of consumer protection, filed a
complaint before the Commercial Court of Vienna (HandelsgerichtWien). Content
Services lost the case and lodged an appeal with the Higher Regional Court of
Vienna (Oberlandesgericht Wien) (hereinafter ‘Higher Regional Court’). The
Higher Regional Court was not satisfied that the consumer is properly informed
about his right of withdrawal by the simple receipt of a link since the website
behind is under the control of the service provider. However, considering that
further interpretation of the DSD was necessary for the case before it, the Higher
Regional Court stayed proceedings and referred a clarification of Article 5(1) of
the DSD (implemented in the Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz) to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The question addressed to the CJEU reads
as follows:
Is the requirement in Article 5(1) of [Directive 97/7] to the effect that a
consumer must receive confirmation of the information specified there in a
durable medium available and accessible to him, unless the information has
already been given to him on conclusion of the contract in a durable medium
available and accessible to him, satisfied where that information is made
available to the consumer by means of a hyperlink on the trader’s website
which is contained in a line of text that the consumer must mark as read by
ticking a box in order to be able to enter into a contractual relationship?18
15 Landgericht (LG) Mannheim, Urteil vom 14 Jan. 2010 – 10 S 53/09 (Amtsgericht Mannheim).
16 LG Hamburg, Urteil vom 10 Dec. 2010 – 406 O 50/10.
17 ‘Polizeiinspektion Osnabrück, (POL-OS): Neue Forderungsschreiben eines bekannten Rechtsan-
waltes beschäftigen die Polizei’, 21 May 2012, available online at http://www.presseportal.
de/polizeipresse/pm/104236/2256247/
pol-os-neue-forderungsschreiben-eines-bekannten-rechtsanwaltes-beschaeftigen-die-polizei.
18 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 25.
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3. The Judgment of the Court of Justice
The CJEU chose to address the question referred to it from two perspectives: (1)
interpreting the terms ‘receive’ and ‘given’ in the context of making information
available according to Article 5(1) DSD and (2) establishing what a durable
medium is in the meaning of the same Article.
3.1. The Interpretation of ‘Receive’ and ‘Given’ in the Context of Making
Information Available According to Article 5(1) DSD
The CJEU established that it is unclear from the travaux préparatoires of the DSD
what meaning the concepts ‘receive’ and ‘given’ have. For this reason, the Court
interpreted these concepts on the basis of their usual meaning in everyday
language.19 The conclusion reached by the Court was that when referring to a
process of transmission, the terms ‘receive’ and ‘given’ entail that the recipient of
information must not take any action. Only sending a link does not meet this
requirement as a consumer then does have to take action by clicking on it in
order to be directed to the relevant information. The Court also tried to
distinguish the wording of Article 5(1) DSD from the neutral formulation of
Article 4(1), according to which the consumer is to be ‘provided’20 with the
relevant information. It considered that ‘receive’ needs more effort on behalf of
the supplier than ‘provide’ since the first would entail the giving of information
and thus the consumer passive conduct, while the latter only means that
information must be made available to the consumer. Furthermore, by looking at
Recital 11 of the preamble to the DSD, the CJEU stated that the purpose of the
DSD itself is to ‘afford consumers extensive protection, by giving them a number
of rights in relation to distance contracts’.21 Since the consumer is not given
sufficient information by being simply sent a link in an e-mail, it was held by the
Court that such practice does not meet the standards of Article 5(1).
3.2. Establishing What a Durable Medium Is in the Meaning of the Same
Article
With respect to the second issue, the Court first determined that the requirement
of putting information in a written format or on a durable medium is functionally
equivalent, as long as use of a new technology does ‘fulfill the same functions as
paper form’.22 The main characteristics of a durable medium are that it stores
information addressed to the consumer personally, that it does not allow for
unilateral changes, that the information is accessible for an adequate period, and
that consumers can reproduce it unchanged. These features are said to be in
19 Ibid., para. 32.
20 See Annex 1.
21 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 36.
22 Ibid., para. 41.
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conformity with the definitions given by Article 2(f) of Directive 2002/65 on
distance marketing of consumer financial services,23 Article 2(12) of Directive
2002/92 on insurance mediation,24 and Article 3(m) of Directive 2008/48 on
consumer credit.25 What is more, the CJEU also argued that the same features
were presented by the Court of the European Free Trade Association (hereinafter
‘EFTA Court’) in the Inconsult Anstalt v. Finanzmarktaufsicht (hereainfter
‘Inconsult Anstalt’) case.26 Inconsult Anstalt was solved in the light of a
distinction between different types of websites made by the European Securities
Markets Expert Group in their 2007 Report.27 The EFTA Court relied on the
Report to determine that, in so far as websites can secure the unchanged
reproduction of information, they are ‘sophisticated’ and can be considered
durable mediums. The Court concluded that the Content Services website cannot
be considered technologically advanced and thus cannot be viewed as a durable
medium.
The Court thus rendered that Article 5(1) of the DSD must be interpreted
in such a way that it does not allow for business practices to rely on the sending of
hyperlinks through e-mail. It was also held that by doing so, information is
neither ‘received’ by the consumer nor ‘given’ to him. Lastly, the Court
submitted that a website such as the one operated by Content Services cannot be
regarded as a durable medium. 28
4. The Reasoning of the Court of Justice
Although it is not the first case dealing with online commerce,29 Content Services
is a milestone in the case law of the CJEU as it reflects new issues arising from
the conclusion of contracts via the internet. Overall, the ruling is somewhat
predictable since practices such as those brought by the Austrian Chamber of
Labor before national courts must undoubtedly be confined, being in clear
violation of various rules in the consumer acquis, among which those enshrined in
the DSD. However, I believe that the CJEU puts forward flawed arguments to
support this outcome. The Content Services judgment is vulnerable to critique for
23 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Sep. 2002 concerning
the distance marketing of consumer financial services, OJ L 271/16.
24 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 Dec. 2002 on
insurance mediation, OJ L 9/3.
25 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 Apr. 2008 on credit
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133/66.
26 Case E-4/09, Inconsult Anstalt v. Finanzmarktaufsicht [2010] EFTA Court Report.
27 EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET EXPERT (ESME) GROUP, Report on Durable Medium –
Distance Marketing Directive and Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, available online at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/durable_medium_en.pdf.
28 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 51.
29 See also Case C-336/03, easyCar (UK) Ltd v. Office of Fair Trading, ECR [2005] I-01947; Case
C-489/07 PiaMessner v. Firma Stefan Krüger [2009] I-07315.
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two reasons: (1) the Court’s interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the terms
‘receive’ and ‘given’ lacks methodological consistency and (2) the Court fails to
bridge the gap between the DSD’s ‘old school’ understanding of technology and
present-day reality. Each of these arguments shall now be discussed.
4.1. The Method of Interpretation by the Court
The Court’s method of interpretation has been recurrently subjected to scrutiny.30
Since European private law is supposed to be a self-standing source of rights and
obligations, it was suggested that the primary methods of interpretation applied
by the Court are literal, teleological, and comparative.31 In the area of consumer
law, while it was thought that the Court was restricted in its interpretive powers
by factors such as the nature of the relevant directives,32 case law shows the
development of new methods. One of these methods was identified as
‘cross-directive’ interpretation,33 and it implies that in order to clarify a European
consumer law concept, the Court actively looks across the consumer acquis.
While this method might have the added benefit of contributing to harmonization,
it sometimes draws parallels between concepts that are in no way identical.
Content Services is a clear example of this. Two points can be made in this
respect.
First, not only is the CJEU’s literal interpretation incomplete and
inconsistent with the various language versions of the DSD, but it is also evidence
of a wrong use of the teleological method. The CJEU interpreted the English
version of the Directive and claimed that while Article 4 imposes a ‘neutral’
formulation of the pre-contractual obligation, namely by stating that information
must be provided to the consumer, Article 5 operates with two essential verbs, ‘to
30 See C. GULMANN, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the European Court of Justice’, 24.
Scandinavian Studies in Law 1980, pp. 187–204, at 197–198; B. VAN DER ESCH, ‘The
Principles of Interpretation Applied by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and
Their Relevance for the Scope of the EEC Competition Rules’, 15. Fordham Int’l LJ (Fordham
International Law Journal) 1991–1992, pp. 366–397; N. FENNELLY, ‘Legal Interpretation at
the European Court of Justice’, 20. Fordham Int’l LJ 1997, pp. 656–679; V. MAK, ‘Harmoni-
sation through “Directive-Related” and “Cross-Directive” Interpretation: The Role of the ECJ in
the Development of European Consumer Law’, 18. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 2010,
pp. 129–146.
31 Report of Mr Justice J.L. MURRAY, President of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of Ireland,
‘Methods of Interpretation – Comparative Law Method’, Actes du colloque pour le cinquantième
anniversaire des Traités de Rome, at p. 39, available online at http://curia.europa.eu/
common/dpi/col_murray.pdf; see also B. VAN DER ESCH, 1991–1992, at p 368.
32 V. MAK, 2010, at p. 137.
33 Ibid., at p. 148; another method common for the interpretation of consumer law cases is the
‘directive-related’ method; see W. VAN GERVEN, ‘ECJ Case-Law as a Means of Unification of
Private Law’, 5. ERPL 1997, pp. 293–308, at 301.
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receive’ and ‘to give’. According to the Court, if we look at the ordinary meaning
of words, there is quite a difference between ‘to give’ and ‘to provide’. However,
the Court does not disclose what definitions it took into account to assess this
difference. The verb ‘to give’ entails ‘to put into the possession of another for his
or her use’34 or ‘to freely transfer the possession of (something) to (someone)’,35
thereby emphasizing the element of handing over or, as the CJEU correctly
indicated, the activeness of the seller or supplier in the transmission process.
However, ‘to provide’ has a more passive meaning, in the sense of ‘to supply or
make available’,36 which does not necessarily mean that the consumer must be
handed over information but that he must simply be put in the position where this
information is accessible to him.
Inconsistency then stems from the fact that different language versions
were indeed taken into account when establishing the neutrality of Article 4, but
the Court failed to look at other language versions when dealing with Article 5.
After all, it is known that the Court does not favour one language version as more
official than others, as it has itself stated: ‘[a]ll the language versions must, in
principle, be recognised as having the same weight and this cannot vary according
to the size of the population of the Member States using the language in
question’.37 The overall consistency problem with the Court’s interpretation arises
out of the fact that not all language versions utilize equivalents of ‘to give’ but
rather of ‘to provide’.38 This can also be seen in the Austrian legislation
implementing the DSD.39 Furthermore, the same can be noticed in the wording of
Article 5(1) second sentence, stating that ‘In any event the following must be
provided […]’ (emphasis added). If this sentence is read to be the mandatory
information standard that businesses must meet whether they have sent the
confirmation on a durable medium or the information was already given, then why
did the European legislator choose to determine the obligation through the
neutral term ‘provide’ rather than ‘given’? The Court did not look into the second
sentence to determine the purpose of Article 5(1) as a whole.
Still, to clarify the interpretation of Article 5(1), the Court looked at
Recital 11 of the preamble. Here it becomes clear the CJEU tried to apply the
34 Merriam-Webster dictionary, available online at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
give.
35 Oxford Dictionary, available online at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/give?q=
give.
36 Oxford Dictionary, available online at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/provide?q=
provide; see also Merriam-Webster dictionary, available online at http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/provide.
37 Case C-296/95, The Queen v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, ex Parte EMU Tabac and
Others [1998] ECR I-1605, para. 36.
38 See Annex 1.
39 Section 5d para. 1 Konsumentenschutzgesetz.
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so-called radical teleological method,40 leaving the level of language discrepancy
in order to grasp the purpose of the Directive. Recital 11 does indeed
acknowledge that using distance communication must not reduce the information
consumers have access to; by doing so, the recital mentions three different ways
of making information available to the consumer based on the verbs used –
providing, sending, supplying. However, the recital does not make a hierarchy as
to how exactly information must reach the consumer – what is important in the
light of the Directive is that consumers are not deprived of information and, what
is more, that they are not deprived of information by sellers or suppliers acting in
bad faith.41 It is for this reason that Article 5(1) should not be interpreted so
narrowly as to suggest that information retrieved by the simple click of a mouse
button does not meet the Directive’s standards. To draw a comparison, if the
consumer is provided with written confirmation via mail, he has to open the
envelope to be able to read the information. The same can be argued if the
consumer receives an e-mail with a PDF file containing the information and has
to download the document by clicking on it. These minor actions undertaken by
the consumer do not in any way contravene with the purpose of the DSD. The
Court’s wrong literal interpretation took precedence over a proper teleological
understanding of the Directive.
Second, the definition of durable medium is taken over from directives that
are not applicable to the case before the Court. This reflects a wrong use of the
‘cross-directive’ method of interpretation. The Court quotes Article 2(f) of the
Distance Marketing Directive, Article 2(12) of the Insurance Mediation Directive
(IMD), and Article 3(m) of the Consumer Credit Directive to define durable
medium.42 In the light of the principle of autonomous interpretation,43 it is true
that ‘durable medium’ should have a European meaning. However, at the same
time one must ask whether consumer protection does not come in nuances. The
referenced directives are part of the Financial Services Action Plan, and as
acknowledged in Recital 9 of the Distance Marketing Directive preamble, ‘[t]he
achievement of the objectives of the Financial Services Action Plan requires a
higher level of consumer protection […]’. The separate regime for financial
services can also be inferred from the DSD itself. Article 3(1) first indent clearly
specifies that financial services are not to be covered by the DSD, which thereby
implicitly recognizes the particular nature and special importance of the financial
sector. Moreover, just by briefly comparing the DSD to the Consumer Credit
40 M. DERLÉN, Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law, Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2009, at p. 47.
41 Article 4(2) DSD.
42 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 44.
43 Case-75/63, Mrs MKH Hoekstra (née Unger) v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel
en Ambachten [1964] ECR 379.
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Directive, interesting differences start emerging: while the DSD only has two
references to ‘durable medium’, the Consumer Credit Directive has 12, and while
the DSD only uses the durable medium concept in connection with the
confirmation of information, the Consumer Credit Directive uses it in relation to
pre-contractual information, drawing up of contracts, overdraft facilities,
borrowing rates, overrunning, and credit intermediaries fees. It is because
financial services have a specific technical complexity raising a lot of
informational problems44 that a special regime has been created for them. It is
simply unclear why the Court applies definitions based on financial services
directives to a non-financial distance contract, but it goes without saying that
these definitions relate to a consumer protection regime that is beyond the
purposes of the DSD. Relying on cross-directive interpretation thus disregards the
differences in consumer protection in different sectors.
4.2. The Court Fails to Bridge the Gap between the DSD’s ‘Old School’
Understanding of Technology and Reality
The second major flaw of the Content Services judgment is about the Court’s
decision on whether businesses can use hyperlinks to direct consumers to
information that is stored on their servers.
As it was also acknowledged by the CJEU, the DSD will be replaced with
Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights as of 13 June 2014.45 This will hopefully
solve issues arising out of the fact that the DSD was not adopted as a solution for
internet contracts. Not only does the Consumer Rights Directive acknowledge in
Recital 5 the potential for further growth of internet sales, but it also specifically
mentions the internet as a means of distance communication in Recital 20.
However, until replaced, the DSD will continue to govern matters arising out of
distance contracts. The Court’s interpretation of ‘durable medium’ is in this
respect not very enlightening. The issue will be addressed in three steps. Firstly,
contracts and technology will be discussed from a general perspective. Secondly,
the Court’s reliance on the content of the durable medium concept given by three
directives on financial services will be challenged. Lastly, alternative solutions will
be proposed.
To start with, trading on the virtual market has led to the elimination of
classical contract through postal materials, which means that a consumer can go
online and conclude contracts by a simple click of a button.46 This practice is
44 P. CARTWRIGHT, ‘Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Putting the Law in Context’, in
P. Cartwright (ed.), Consumer Protection in Financial Services, Kluwer Law International, London
1999, at p. 10.
45 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 44.
46 R.S. CONKLIN, ‘Be Careful What You Click For: An Analysis of Online Contracting’, 20. Loyola
Consumer Law Review 2007–2008, pp 325–347, at 325.
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generally called clickwrap, and it entails that a user ticks a box to confirm he
agrees with the terms and conditions and subsequently clicks himself into a
contract.47 The more aggressive version of internet contracting is known as
browsewrap, where simply by using the services on a webpage or by browsing
through it, a contract can be considered to have been formed.48 The
crystallization of these practices shows how the virtual market is responding to
the needs of the modern consumer, who is in need of a simple way to purchase
goods and services.
The shift from written to electronic contracts still raises many fascinating
questions dealing with form, but perhaps the most interesting one is: do the two
environments need to fulfil the same functions? The affirmative answer was
submitted to the CJEU by the Austrian, Belgian, and Greek governments in the
context of the Content Services case.49
Legal scholarship holds that there are three functions to legal (written)
form: (1) evidentiary – requiring sufficient evidence, (2) cautionary – limiting
impulsive transactions, and (3) channelling – standardizing certain types of
transactions.50 However, these functions are not likely to apply when internet
contracts offer consumers the benefit of efficiency. Perhaps the most speaking
example is represented by the Apple App Store: simply by attaching a credit card
number to an Apple account, one can buy various applications with a single
screen tap. This is to say the cautionary function not only is unfulfilled, but also
there is simply no reason to rely on it, as long as transactions are kept within
low-value limits. In the same vein, even if normal paper can have a lifespan of
several decades, it has been pointed out that some electronic media, for instance
CD-ROMs, deteriorate within as little as two years.51
So we can already claim that written and electronic media should only be
considered similar in so far as their functions overlap. With this in mind, we will
now proceed to the next step of the analysis and determine whether websites can
be durable mediums.
47 J.J. TRACY, ‘Browsewrap Agreements: Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.’, 11. Boston University
Journal of Science and Technology Law 2005, pp. 164–172; D. STREETER, ‘Into Contract’s
Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses’, 39. San Diego Law Review 2002,
pp. 1363–1394; C.L. KUNZ et al., ‘Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements’, 59. The Business Lawyer 2003–2004, pp. 279–312.
48 G.L. FOUNDS, ‘Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?’, 52. Federal
Communications Law Journal 1999-2000, pp. 99–124; N.J. DAVIS, ‘Presumed Assent: The
Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap’, 22. Berkeley Technology Law Journal 2007, pp. 577–598.
49 Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer, para. 41.
50 S. HEDLEY, The Law of Electronic Commerce and the Internet in the UK and Ireland, London
Cavendish Publishing, 2006, p. 251.
51 J. HORLINGS, ‘CD-R’s binnen twee jaar onleesbaar’, PC Active, 20 Jul. 2004, available online at
http://www.pc-active.nl/component/content/article/10508.
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To define a ‘durable medium’, the Court borrowed a definition used in
three financial services directives discussed previously.52 This definition relies on
three pillars also used by the EFTA Court in the InconsultAnstalt case:
The Internet site in question must constitute an instrument which (a) enables
the customer to store information addressed personally to him, (b) enables him
to store such information in a way accessible for future reference for a period
of time adequate to the purposes of the information, and (c) allows for the
unchanged reproduction of the information stored.53
Assuming arguendo that this definition would apply to the DSD in spite of its
more stringent scope over financial services, at first sight it seems quite
reasonable, but a closer look to its sources leads the reader to a different
direction. Since the definition’s components are rather abstract, Recital 20 of the
preamble of the Distance Marketing Directive and Article 2(11) second sentence
of the IMD, having exactly the same content, attempt to exemplify what durable
mediums are in practice:
Durable mediums include in particular floppy discs, CDROMs, DVDs and the
hard drive of the consumer’s computer on which the electronic mail is stored,
but they do not include Internet websites unless they fulfill the criteria
contained in the definition of a durable medium.
It goes without saying that giving floppy discs as an example must simply be
ignored because computers do not even have floppy disc drives anymore.54 As for
CDROMs, even if we discard the lifespan problem presented earlier, what are the
chances that an online bookstore will send the consumer a CDROM or a DVD
with the terms and conditions of the contract? The unfeasibility of this provision
is also demonstrated by the fact that it does not even make reference to simple
e-mail but to e-mail that is received on personal accounts linked to the
consumer’s computer, enabling the consumer to make back-ups of the data on his
own personal hard drive. This would immediately leave out e-mail accounts from
operators such as Gmail, Yahoo, or Hotmail because unless the user downloads all
his mail, it will not make it to his own hard drive but will be stored on the e-mail
company’s servers. This provision did not make it into the Consumer Credit
Directive, and neither is it found in the Consumer Rights Directive. Actually,
52 See sec. 4.1.
53 Case E-4/09 Inconsult Anstalt v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, para. 32.
54 T. SPRING, ‘What Has Your Floppy Drive Done for You Lately?’, PCWorld, 24 Jul. 2002,
available online at http://www.pcworld.com/article/103037/article.html.
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Annex 1 of the Consumer Rights Directive makes a reference to ‘durable medium
(e.g., e-mail)’ without adding the prerequisite of own hard disc storage. It is thus
only reasonable to claim that Recital 20 of the preamble of the DMD and Article
2(11) second sentence of the IMD, first of all, impose impractically high standards
for durable mediums and, second of all, relate to technology in a decrepit manner.
If we disregard the supporting text just discussed, the durable medium
definition does not per se exclude websites. However, if they are considered to be
durable mediums, what exact properties must websites have? This leads us to the
third step of the argument, namely how present-day technology can be used for
alternative solutions. This point is important because the Court did not take its
argument any further than establishing how the website at hand
(opendownload.de) cannot be considered a durable medium.
It can be agreed that a durable medium must provide the following
characteristics: durability, availability, and accessibility. Meeting these require-
ments substantially depends on what software is used on the website. The
European Securities Market Expert group (ESME), to which the EFTA Court
refers, distinguishes between so-called ‘ordinary’ and ‘sophisticated’ websites,
specifying that the latter category can very well be assimilated to the notion of
‘durable medium’.55 The interesting addition made by this report is PDF
technology. If a consumer is sent an e-mail with a link to a PDF file, then the
consumer can very well access and save the information. Moreover, it is easier to
prove the content of e-mail communication since it can always be reproduced.
This does not hold for postal communication, where the seller or supplier can
prove to have sent an envelope to the consumer but not that the envelope actually
included written confirmation in the meaning of Article 5(1).
Could the same result be achieved by simply posting information on a
website? In principle, it can very well be the case. First of all, this option could be
more practical for businesses operating in good faith, whose transparency in
offering information is reflected by specific sections on the website dealing with
terms and conditions, delivery, payment, FAQs, etc. Then, the consumer could
simply be redirected to the website after the conclusion of the contract. However,
it is not always the case that businesses are transparent on the internet or, what is
worse, that they are consistent in their transparency. Still, even if there are
businesses that change their terms and conditions within the time of contractual
performance, it is unfeasible to consider that information can simply disappear
into electronic thin air in an age where Google records every search made by its
users and it is impossible to delete information posted on Facebook. Free internet
archives such as the WayBackMachine (archive.org) can take users back to see
how specific websites used to look like starting with 1996 and until the present
55 ESME, Report on Durable Medium – Distance Marketing Directive and Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive.
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day. Looked at from a more holistic view, the circulation of information on the
internet does not seem as discretionary as the Court implies in the Content
Services case. In the end, companies have access to editing their websites.
However, if they do so, it must not be immediately inferred that the website is not
a durable medium but that the business is simply not offering relevant
information anymore.
Another alternative for operating information on websites could be the
creation of user accounts where businesses can make available to the consumer
certain personal information, where a consumer can keep track of his activity,
etc. Such accounts are very common with Ebay and operate on multiple levels – a
user not only can obtain access to general information provided by the company
but also can manage personal communications. Moreover, cloud accounts such as
Dropbox, Google drive, or SugarSync offer free and generous server space for
users to be able to access their own data online – a sort of online hard disk drive.
The account as such is under the control of the user, but the server is not; this is
to say that Dropbox has the access to delete information from a user’s account,
but by doing so it incurs liability for privacy infringements.
6. Conclusion
That the CJEU interprets consumer directives in a pro-consumer manner is not
new and has been well addressed in the academic literature.56 Nonetheless, the
Content Services judgment sheds new light on how the Court profiles the internet
consumer, namely as vulnerable, passive and, uninformed. This profile is contrary
to what polls show about cross-border trade – that consumer online confidence is
on the rise.57
In the end, the Content Services case fails the test of what is compatible
with the needs of technology and the modern consumer in four important ways.
First, it applies a higher consumer protection regime than what can be read in the
DSD, by interpreting terminological issues in a manner that discarded other
language versions of the Directive than the English one. Second, it looks at
financial services directives to clarify operational concepts, when financial
services are known to benefit from a higher level of consumer protection due to
the nature of the subject. Third, even if the definition taken from the financial
56 V. MAK, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer” – Lessons from Financial Literacy Studies’,
TISCO Working Paper Series on Banking, Finance and Services No. 03/2012, p. 8;
H. UNBERATH & A. JOHNSTON, ‘The Double-Headed Approach of the ECJ concerning
Consumer Protection’, 44. CMLR 2007, pp. 1237–1284; N. REICH, ‘Protection of Consumers’
Economic Interests by EC Contract Law: Some Follow-up Remarks’, 28. Sydney Law Review
2006, pp. 37–62, at 43.
57 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ‘Consumer Protection in the Internal Market’, 298. Special
Eurobarometer 2008, p. 84.
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services directives was applicable, its interpretation is once again too narrow to be
practically possible in the case of supplying non-financial services or selling
goods. Fourth, commonly used technologies are not presented by the Court since
in spite of the case’s impact and widespread importance for online operators, the














German verfügen erhalten erteiltwurden übermitteln
French bénéficier recevoir fournies fournies
Spanish disponer recibir facilitado facilitarse
Italian ricevere ricevere fornite forniti
Romanian beneficieze primească furnizate mentioneze
Dutch beschikken Ontvangt verstrekt verstrekt
Portuguese dispor receber fornecidas fornecidos
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